Sample Pty Ltd

Cyber Security Assessment for Board/C Suite focused on handling Sensitive Data and in line with DISP , ITAR and ACSC ISM

GuardWare ASSESSOR

Briefing Intent

- This sample is indicative of the report which you'll receive at the end of an assessment.
- This redacted report is from assessments done on a number of Defence Suppliers.
- The report provides clarity around the type of user behaviour, data movement and cyber risks that you can expect to be covered during the assessment.

Assessment Scope

The scope of GuardWare Assessment is to assess Client's current security processes and controls (ISMS) based on the following criteria:

1. **Ability to securely handle commercially sensitive data in line with Information Security Manual (ISM) recommendations.**
2. **Ability to securely handle Defence related data in line with the requirements of Entry Level DISP.**
3. **Ability to securely handle ITAR related data.**

Note: Physical security of office environment and equipment is out of scope for this project.

Assessment Summary

Monitoring Parameters:

- Only Client owned devices were covered.
- The following types of data were monitored:
  - Sensitive data covering ITAR and Defence labelled information
  - Generic Documents
  - General files of any type including source code, images, zip etc
- Monitoring USE CASES included those recommended under ACSC ISM, ITAR and for secure handling for Defence Related Data under DISP.

Monitoring done from 26th Nov to 13th Dec 2022	158 users monitored on 146 devices
16 High risk actions detected which require urgent attention	4 Medium risk actions detected
2 suspicious activities detected – Need urgent action	No controls in place to ensure secure handling of Sensitive data
No incident detection capability present in the event of a loss or theft of data	Non-Compliance with 2 of ES8 control. App Control and Restrict Admin privileges
Non-Compliance with Secure Defence data handling procedures as per DISP and ISM	Non-Compliance with ITAR regulation.

Risk Summary

Use Cases	Technical Control Implemented/Partial/Not Implemented/Failed Control	Risk Level (No Risk, Low, Medium, High)
Data transfer using external storage media		
High use of unencrypted USBs. 44 users detected using unencrypted USBs to transfer data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
High transfer rate. 8 users transferred over 1000 files.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Outside of normal business hours. High rate of transfers detected outside of normal working hours.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Transfer of Potential Sensitive Data. • Top 8 users detected transferring 1000s of design related files. • Several users transferred files containing potential sensitive data	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of transfers. Visibility of sensitive data transferred using external media	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Suspicious User Activities		
Suspicious User Activity – User1 - **Use of personal emails to send corporate data** 1. User detected using his personal email to send highly sensitive ITAR marked data to unauthorized 3rd parties. 2. Non-Compliance under ITAR.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Suspicious User Activity – User2 – **Data copied by user about to leave the organisation.** 1. User copied 1000s of design files also printed his CV during the same time. 2. There is evidence he has visited job sites (Indeed) and applied for Defence related engineering jobs around the same time when he copied the files. 3. The files have been copied on unencrypted USBs which most likely are personal. 4. He is also seen accessing and uploading files to personal Google Drive. 5. He belongs to the Defence User Group.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Use Cases	Technical Control Implemented/Partial/Not Implemented/Failed Control	Risk Level (No Risk, Low, Medium, High)
Corporate Email Analysis		
Corporate emails forwarded to own personal emails. Email detected being forwarded to user own personal email.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Visibility of email forwards. Visibility of what files have been forwarded by users to personal and free emails to ensure they are accounted for.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Use of Personal Emails		
Use of Personal emails detected. Personal emails have been used to send data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of Personal Email Use. Visibility is required to ensure company data is not being sent out via personal emails.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Use of Non Organisational Unauthorised Applications		
Technical Control Circumvented. The users seem to have found a way to install non-organisational applications. **Non-Compliance of 2 of the ES8 Controls.** 1. Restrict administrative privileges 2. Application control	**Failed Technical Control**	**High**
Visibility of Application Use. Visibility of what applications are being used by users.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Data transfer using Non-Corporate Data sharing APPs and Websites		
Risky Transfer Application Use. 6 users detected using Dropbox or Google Drive to transfer files. Transfers include potentially sensitive data.	**Failed Technical Control**	**High**
Risky website Use.19 users detected using Facebook and potentially transferring data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of transfers. Visibility of sensitive data transferred using APPs and encrypted websites.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Use Cases	Technical Control Implemented/Partial/Not Implemented/Failed Control	Risk Level (No Risk, Low, Medium, High)
Printing of Sensitive Data		
Printing of potential sensitive data. Printing of sensitive data was observed.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Printing use personal Printers. As users are allowed to work from home there is risk of files being printed using home printers.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Visibility of Printing. Visibility of what files have been printed either via organisational or personal printers to ensure they are accounted for.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Access of information		
Authorised Access of sensitive Information. Ensuring authorised users can access files	**Implemented**	**No Risk**
Access Visibility. Visibility of who is accessing what files	**Implemented**	**No Risk**

Trusted Insider Program monitoring suggestion as per ISM and DISP

Trusted insider program

As a trusted insider's system access and knowledge of business processes often makes them harder to detect, establishing and maintaining a trusted insider program can assist an organisation to detect and respond to trusted insider threats before they occur, or limit damage if they do occur. In doing so, an organisation will likely obtain the most benefit by logging and analysing the following user activities:

1. excessive copying or modification of files
2. unauthorised or excessive use of removable media
3. connecting devices capable of data storage to systems
4. unusual system usage outside of normal business hours
5. excessive data access or printing compared to their peers
6. data transfers to unauthorised cloud services or webmail
7. use of unauthorised Virtual Private Networks, file transfer applications or anonymity networks.

Control: ISM-1625; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A
A trusted insider program is developed, implemented and maintained.

Control: ISM-1626; Revision: 0; Updated: Nov-20; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A
Legal advice is sought regarding the development and implementation of a trusted insider program.

Reference: ACSC Information Security Manual.

Mapping to Trusted Insider USE CASEs as per ACSC ISM

Recommended Use Cases Under ISM	Detected/Not Detected/Not Tested
excessive copying or modification of files	Detected
unauthorised or excessive use of removable media	Detected
connecting devices capable of data storage to systems	Detected
unusual system usage outside of normal business hours	Detected
excessive data access or printing compared to their peers	Detected
data transfers to unauthorised cloud services or webmail	Detected
use of unauthorised Virtual Private Networks, file transfer applications or anonymity networks.	Detected

Mapping to Entry Level DISP requirements

Entry Level DISP Requirements	Current Status in Client	Compliant/Non-Compliant
Meeting top 4 requirements of the ACSC Essential 8: • Application control; • Patch applications; • Restrict administrative privileges; • Patch operating systems	Potential use of non-organisational applications has been observed. If these were explicitly not allowed by Admin the company will fail the following ACSC ES8 Controls. 1. Restrict administrative privileges. 2. Application control.	Non-Compliant
Handling Official and Official Sensitive information as per DSPF and ISM. The requirements place a **Need to** requirement when accessing, transferring and printing sensitive information. Further transfer of Official information should be done using encrypted channels.	The company lacks visibility of users accessing, transferring and printing data and has no technical means to verify the **Need** of any of the actions. Further use of unencrypted external storage devices has been observed.	Non-Compliant
Insider Threat Program. Under this requirement users are required to handle sensitive information appropriately.	The company lacks visibility of users accessing, transferring and printing data and has no way to verify if the correct steps are being taken by the staff members on an ongoing basis	Non-Compliant
Incident Detection and Response. Under this requirement clear visibility of risky incidents involving sensitive data is required. Only when you know that data has been put at risk can you try and address it through appropriate responses.	The company lacks visibility of users accessing, transferring and printing data. This can place company's data at risk without their knowledge.	Non-Compliant

SharePoint Risks

Covers Sharing and access of files by internal and external users.

SharePoint Risk – Monitoring and Control of External User Access

SharePoint Risk		
Visibility of Downloads of Files by internal and external users. Visibility of what files have been downloaded by internal and external users. Once downloaded, we lose control over the data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of Shared Files to external users. Visibility of what files have been shared to external users.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

SharePoint is Defacto File server for most organisations which is accessible from anywhere and from any device including personal devices.

Risk 1: Monitoring of files accessed by internal and external users is critical to ensure security of data.

Risk 2: Wrong configuration of libraries can easily result in access of sensitive data by internal and external users when shared.

Risk 3: Sensitive data can be shared accidentally to unauthorised external users.

Sharepoint Access External

Search | Per Page 50

By File | By User

File Name	Number of Users	Number of Incidents
e-Safe Compliance User Manual v2 Draft 4.docx	1	18
Excercise 1 Map the data to its classification .docx	1	8
Guardware - Data Monitoring and scoping form v3.xlsx	1	11
Guardware Company Decisions.xlsx	1	8
GuardWare INSIGHT User Manual v2.pdf	1	6

Sharepoint Access External > GuardWare INSIGHT User Manual v2.pdf

Search

By User

User Name	Email Address	Site Url	File Path	Date Time	Incident Type
richard	richard@gmail.com	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	2025-01-24 04:34:32	AnonymousLinkUsed
richard	richard@gmail.com	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	2025-01-24 04:34:32	SharingLinkUsed
selina	selina@yahoo.com	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	2025-01-10 04:15:35	AnonymousLinkUsed
selina	selina@yahoo.com	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	2025-01-10 04:15:35	SharingLinkUsed

SharePoint Risk – Files downloaded to personal devices. There is a need for Visibility.

Sharepoint Audit Logs

Search

By File | By Platform | By IP address

Platform Name	Secure link created	Anonymous Link Created	Accessed by(internal)	Accessed by(external)	Downloaded by(internal)	Downloaded by(external)
-	0	0	8,735	37	0	0
Android	1	0	6	0	1	0
iPhone	0	0	32	5	11	0
MacOSX	1	15	47	35	10	6
NotSpecified	82	0	622	16	115	0
OfficeCollaborationService	0	0	50	0	0	0

- **Files downloaded by users which can be to Corporate and personal devices**
- **Need to ensure visibility of data.**

Android

Accessed by(internal)	Downloaded by(internal)
Username	Username2
rizwan.m	simon.s
grishma.k	
roshan.b	

MacOSX

Anonymous Link Created	Accessed by(external)	Downloaded by(external)
Username3	Username4	Username5
pritijan.m	anonymous	anonymous
rabin.t		
prakash.c		

IPhone

Accessed by(internal)	Accessed by(external)	Downloaded by(internal)
Username6	Username7	Username8
richard.m		akhil.s
akhil.s		richard.m
		selina.t

Risky Sharing of Data

Data transfer using external storage media		
Files shared using anonymous links to external users..	Technical control not implemented	High
Sensitive files shared to external users. Potential Unauthorised access.	Technical control not implemented	High

Sharepoint has made access and sharing of information incredibly easy and accessible from anywhere. Unfortunately, users often tend to have the false sense of security that all data in SharePoint is secured. Reality is if SharePoint is not configured properly and monitored it can easily become a major source of data leak.

Risk 1: Anonymous sharing is a risky action. As external users can simply share and access the link without any check and balance.

Risk 2: Sensitive data can be maliciously or unknowingly shared by authorised users to internal or external unauthorized users**.**

Anonymous Sharing of files

Sensitive data accessed by external users

SharePoint Risk → Ensure Authorised Internal Company Access to libraries and files.

Sharepoint Library

Search

Library Name

User Name	Library Name	Site Name	File Name	Secure link created	Anonymous Link Created	Accessed by(internal)	Accessed by(external)	Downloaded by(internal)
selina.t	Shared Documents/Development/DevelopmentPlan/	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/Documents/INSIGHTDevelopment/	GuardWare INSIGHT User Manual v2.pdf	0	1	15	6	0
akhil.s	Deployment/Report/	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/Documents/Schedule/	INSIGHT Report Update v1.docx	0	0	26	5	15

Sharepoint Library > Accessed By (Internal) > Shared Documents/Development/DevelopmentPlan/

Search

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By User

User Name	Email Address	SiteUrl	File Path	Incident Date	Incident Time	Incident Type
selina.t	selina.t@guardware.com.au	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/Documents/INSIGHTDevelopment/	Shared Documents/Development/DevelopmentPlan/	2024-12-30	07:14:10	FilePreviewed
selina.t	selina.t@guardware.com.au	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/Documents/INSIGHTDevelopment/	Shared Documents/Development/DevelopmentPlan	2024-12-30	22:39:51	FilePreviewed

- **Access and download of files by users. Need to ensure it is authorised access.**
- **Need to ensure visibility of data.**

Anonymous Access - SharePoint Risk

● Sharepoint File log > Anonymous Link Created > File name > GuardWare INSIGHT User Manual v2.pdf

Search

By User

User Name	Site Url	File Path	Email Address	Incident Date	Incident Time	Incident Type
akhil.s	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	akhil.s@guardware.com.au	2025-01-09	07:49:24	AnonymousLinkCreated

● Sharepoint File log > Downloaded By (External) > File name > GuardWare INSIGHT User Manual v2.pdf

Search

By User

User Name	Site Url	File Path	Email Address	Incident Date	Incident Time	Incident Type
anonymous	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport/	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	anonymous	2025-01-24	04:34:38	FileDownloaded
anonymous	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport/	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	anonymous	2025-01-10	04:15:41	FileDownloaded
anonymous	https://guardwarecomau.sharepoint.com/sites/GuardWareSupport/	Shared Documents/Trainings and help files/Overall System Manual/	anonymous	2025-01-10	05:58:53	FileDownloaded

Storage Media Analysis

Covers all types of media including phone sync.

Data transfer using USBs

Data transfer using external storage media		
High use of unencrypted USBs. 44 users detected using unencrypted USBs to transfer data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
High transfer rate. 8 users transferred over 1000 files.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Outside of normal business hours. High rate of transfers detected outside of normal working hours.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**



User Name	User Group	Total Events
xxxxx	Customer Group	26256
xxxxx	Customer Group	5221
xxxxx	Customer Group	4212
xxxxx	Customer Group	3362
xxxxx	Customer Group	2326
xxxxx	Customer Group	2125
xxxxx	Customer Group	1782
xxxxx	Customer Group	1506
xxxxx	Customer Group	9
xxxxx	Customer Group	5
xxxxx	Customer Group	4
xxxxx	Customer Group	3
xxxxx	Customer Group	2
xxxxx	Customer Group	2

Hour	Working Day	Non-Working Day
0:00 - 1:00	0	0
1:00 - 2:00	0	0
2:00 - 3:00	0	0
3:00 - 4:00	0	0
4:00 - 5:00	0	0
5:00 - 6:00	0	0
6:00 - 7:00	0	0
7:00 - 8:00	0	0
8:00 - 9:00	562	0
9:00 - 10:00	41	320
10:00 - 11:00	10	8798
11:00 - 12:00	2	331
12:00 - 13:00	2221	4444
13:00 - 14:00	14	2144
14:00 - 15:00	5312	0
15:00 - 16:00	18620	0
16:00 - 17:00	421	0
17:00 - 18:00	2904	0
18:00 - 19:00	7563	0
19:00 - 20:00	33111	0
20:00 - 21:00	7	0
21:00 - 22:00	5	0
22:00 - 23:00	2	0
23:00 - 24:00	2	0

The use of USBs may be for legitimate reasons but there are significant risks involved.

Risk. Loss of phone or USBs is a common source of data breach and should be monitored and accounted for.

Risk. Potential Insider risk. Non-compliant with Trusted Insider Program monitoring requirements as per the ISM.

Risk. Non-compliance risk to DISP/DSPF. Under these regulations there should be a valid NEED for transferring Defence related information and there should be appropriate visibility to ensure Insider Threat Management and Incident Response in case of loss.

Risk. Use of unencrypted USBs can easily lead to Data loss

Movement of Sensitive Data using USBs

Data transfer using external storage media		
Transfer of Potential Sensitive Data. • Top 8 users detected transferring 1000s of design related files. • Several users transferred files containing potential sensitive data	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of transfers. Visibility of sensitive data transferred using external media	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Risk. Without the ability to monitor what is transferred, the company will not even know if data is lost or stolen and will not be able to perform Incident management.

Risk. Potential Insider risk. Non-compliant with Trusted Insider Program monitoring requirements as per the ISM.

Risk. Non-compliance risk to DISP/DSPF. Under these regulations there should be a valid NEED for transferring Defence related information and there should be appropriate visibility to ensure Insider Threat Management and Incident Response in case of loss.

Risk. Use of unencrypted USBs can easily lead to Data loss



User 1



User 2



User 3

Suspicious User Activity

Suspicious User Activity – User1 - Suspicious User Activity – User1 - **Use of personal emails to send corporate data**

Suspicious User Activity		
Potential Insider Risk. 1. User detected using his personal email to send highly sensitive ITAR marked data to unauthorized 3rd parties. 2. Non-Compliance under ITAR.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Use of personal emails is a common occurrence in organisations but needs to be monitored as can lead data leak.

Risk: Use of personal emails to exfiltrate data out consistently reported as one of the key ways data is lost or stolen in organisations and needs to be monitored.



Email violation detail	
Review Status :	Not Reviewed
Violation Date & Time :	[redacted]10:26:10
Subject :	this is the file
User Name :	[redacted]
Email Domain Used :	www.mail.google.com
From :	[redacted]@gmail.com
Recipients :	TO:[redacted]com CC: BCC:
PC Name :	[redacted]
PC Serial Number :	[redacted]
Action :	Default
View complete email	

Rules Violated
Defence Classified Information
Document Movements
General File Movement

Email Body/File Attachment
New Design Specs - Copy.docx

Detected content in email body / file attachment

Word	Context
CONFIDENTIAL	[redacted] private management confidential t[redacted]an fam
MANAGEMENT	[redacted]ken systems private management confidential

Suspicious User Activity – User2 – Data copied by user about to leave the organisation.

Suspicious User Activity		
Potential Insider Risk. 1. User copied 1000s of design files also printed his CV during the same time. 2. There is evidence he has visited job sites (Indeed) and applied for Defence related engineering jobs around the same time when he copied the files. 3. The files have been copied on unencrypted USBs which most likely are personal. 4. He is also seen accessing and uploading files to personal Google Drive. 5. He belongs to the Defence User Group.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Risk. Rapid and frequent transfer of large amounts of company data, the fact that the user is reviewing his CV and is applying for jobs are all tell-tale signs of a potential insider threat in progress.

Risk. The user has personal Dropbox installed meaning he has circumvented company policy.

Print Event List for XXXXX using printer Canon-X53Series

User Name	User Group Name	PC Name	File Name	Event Date	Event Time	File Path
XXXXX	Client Group	LAP2u82	my cv 2022.docx	02-12-2022	13:40:55	c:\users\XXXX\Downloads\my cv 2022.doc

Data copied to 2 distinct unencrypted USBs. Early Morning and on Weekend.

Serial Number	Insertion Date/Time	Removeal Date/Time	Number Files
531455422	2022-12-18 22:20:16	2022-12-18 00:00:00	9685
531455422	2022-12-18 09:47:04	2022-12-18 10:20:16	6622
931222212	2022-12-25 08:31:19	2022-12-25 09:47:04	15633
931222212	2022-12-25 19:35:33	2022-12-25 20:31:19	8952

Suspicious User Activity- User 1

Applying for Job on Seek the next day.

Date/Time	Duration	Full URL
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:05:36	au.indeed.com/[redacted]edabda9de58bfe0f2ff
2022/12/03 17:30:00	0:18:41	au.indeed.com/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:01:40	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]c
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:01:30	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]2
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:01:09	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]ff
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:01:10	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]f
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:50	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]f
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:44	au.indeed.com/companies/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:41	au.indeed.com/companies/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:36	au.indeed.com/companies/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:29	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]0
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:26	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]f6
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:25	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:23	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:30:00	0:00:23	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:16	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:13	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]77
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:11	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]b5
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:11	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:30:00	0:00:11	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:06	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]f
2022/12/09 17:30:00	0:00:06	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]2
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:04	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]
2022/12/03 17:30:00	0:00:04	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]6
2022/12/03 17:00:00	0:00:03	au.indeed.com/job/[redacted]

Email Analysis

Covers both Corporate and Personal Email transactions.

Forwarding emails to personal emails

Corporate Email Analysis		
Corporate emails forwarded to own personal emails. Email detected being forwarded to user own personal email.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Visibility of email forwards. Visibility of what files have been forwarded by users to personal and free emails to ensure they are accounted for.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Forwarding emails to personal and other free emails is a common cause of leakage and non-compliance

Risk: Forwarding corporate information to personal emails leads to information creep. The action needs to be checked in the event sensitive information is forwarded to free emails.









Use of personal emails to send data

Use of Personal Emails		
Use of Personal emails to send corporate data detected. Personal emails have been used to send corporate data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of Personal Email Use. Visibility is required to ensure company data is not being sent out via personal emails.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Use of personal emails is a common occurrence in organisations but needs to be monitored as can lead to data leaks.

Risk: Use of personal emails to exfiltrate data out consistently reported as one of the key ways data is lost or stolen in organisations and needs to be monitored.



Use of Non Organisational Unauthorised Applications

Non-Compliance of 2 of the ES8 Controls.

1. Restrict administrative privileges
2. Application control

Installation and Use of Non-organisational applications

Data transfer using non-corporate applications		
Technical Control Circumvented. The users seem to have found a way to install non-organisational applications. **Non-Compliance of 2 of the ES8 Controls.** 1. Restrict administrative privileges 2. Application control	**Failed Technical Control**	**High**
Visibility of Application Use. Visibility of what applications are being used by users.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Software Name	Vendor	Number of PCs with Software Present	Number of PCs with Software Usage	Total Usage Duration
MESSENGER.EXE	Facebook Inc.	5	3	1:15:00
TELEGRAM.EXE	Telegram	5	2	0:41:40
WHATSAPP.EXE	WhatsApp	6	2	0:17:30
FILEZILLA.EXE	FileZilla Project	1	1	0:08:41
DROPBOX.EXE	Dropbox, Inc.	8		
OPERA.EXE	Opera Software	2		

The use of personal applications without proper authorization and vetting may be for legitimate reasons, but there are significant risks involved.

Risk. Standard users should not have admin rights to install applications. It can result in malware infection and highlights that the current controls are failing to implement 2 of the ES8 Controls.

1. Restrict administrative privileges
2. Application control.

Data transfer using Non Corporate Data sharing APPs and Websites

Data transfer using Non-Org applications

Data transfer using non-corporate applications		
Risky Transfer Application Use. 6 users detected using Dropbox or Google Drive to transfer files. Transfers include potential sensitive data.	**Failed Technical Control**	**High**
Visibility of transfers. Visibility of sensitive data transferred using external media	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**





User Name	User Group	Total Events
xxxxxx	Client Group	34443
xxxxxx	Client Group	1722
xxxxxx	Client Group	1428
xxxxxx	Client Group	17

The use of personal cloud services and applications may be for legitimate reasons, but there are significant risks involved.

Risk. Unauthorized access by former staff members. Information stored in personal cloud account remains with its user after he leaves a company and therefore can result in a breach as per NDB Scheme.

Risk. Applications like Dropbox, OneDrive, and Google Drive sync files to any device where a user is logged into these applications. This may include their personal devices or, even worse, those of a different company, which could result in the loss of sensitive information.

29-11-2022	14:03:28	DROPBOX	1231212.docx
29-11-2022	14:03:28	DROPBOX	1-product comparison-latest- jun 2018 copy.xlsx
29-11-2022	14:03:28	DROPBOX	1-product comparison-latest- jun 2018.xlsx
29-11-2022	14:03:29	DROPBOX	1231212_00.docx
29-11-2022	14:03:29	DROPBOX	1231212_00_11.docx
29-11-2022	14:03:29	DROPBOX	amex2222_3.xls
29-11-2022	14:03:29	DROPBOX	az-100.docx
29-11-2022	14:03:30	DROPBOX	capture.png
29-11-2022	14:03:30	DROPBOX	claim - copy.xls
29-11-2022	14:03:43	DROPBOX	client4.4.0.10 - lc-temora.msi
29-11-2022	14:03:56	DROPBOX	contract form.doc
29-11-2022	14:03:56	DROPBOX	creditcard.docx
29-11-2022	14:03:57	DROPBOX	customer info.xlsx
29-11-2022	14:03:57	DROPBOX	customer_info.docx
29-11-2022	14:03:58	DROPBOX	customer_offer letter.docx

Data transfer using Non-organisational websites

Data transfer using non-corporate applications		
Risky website Use.19 users detected using Facebook and potentially transferring data.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**
Visibility of transfers. Visibility of sensitive data transferred using APPs and encrypted websites.	**Technical control not implemented**	**High**

Transferring of files to non-corporate websites may be for legitimate reasons, but there are significant risks involved.

Risk. Can result in a breach if sensitive or PII data is uploaded to non-corporate websites either accidentally or due to malicious intent.





Printing Analysis

Printing of Potential Sensitive Information

Printing of Sensitive Data		
Printing of potential sensitive data. Printing of sensitive data was observed.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Printing use personal Printers. As users are allowed to work from home there is risk of files being printed using home printers.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**
Visibility of Printing. Visibility of what files have been printed either via organisational or personal printers to ensure they are accounted for.	**Technical control not implemented**	**Medium**



Printer Name	Total Events
\\rbcmon02\[redacted]-Office	25
\\RBCPRN01\[redacted]-Office	22
\\rbcprn01\[redacted]Office	19
\\RBCPRN01\[redacted]-Office	12
D-Accounts	6
Microsoft Print to PDF	5
\\rbcmon02\[redacted]-Office2	5
\\rbcprn01\[redacted]-Office	5
Microsoft Print to PDF	4
\\rbcprn01\[redacted]-Manager Office	3
Canon TS3300 series	3
OneNote for Windows 10	2
Adobe PDF	2
\\RBCPRN01\[redacted]-Office	2
I Block Lv2 Toshiba	2
[redacted]-Admin	2
HP8A771D (HP Officejet Pro 6830)	2
\\rbcprn01\[redacted]-Office	1
Adobe PDF	1
HPBBF063 (HP OfficeJet Pro 8710)	1
\\RBCPRN01\[redacted]-Office	1
[redacted]	1
HP000756 (HP Officejet 6600)	1
Brother HL-1110 series	1
Adobe PDF	1
Brother MFC-L3750CDW series Printer	1
\\RBCPRN01\[redacted]-Office	1
\\rbcprn01\[redacted]-Office	1
Canon MG6200 series Printer XPS	1

The use of these printers may be for legitimate reasons but can result in a breach.

Risk. According to ACSC Loss of printed information is a common occurrence leading to a data breach. As such printing of material needs to be monitored and controlled. Users should be made responsible for the security of printed materials. All printing events need to be monitored.

Access of files

Access of files

Access of information		
Authorised Access of sensitive Information. Ensuring authorised users can access files	**Implemented**	**No Risk**
Access Visibility. Visibility of who is accessing what files	**Implemented**	**No Risk**

The company has visibility and means to validate if authorised users are accessing sensitive data.

DLP File Access Incidents by Rule Name

Rule Name	mber of	Number of Files
Defence Classified Information	79	1086
Document Access	146	19567

File Name	User Name	Date	Time	File Path
mp-23 project brief.doc	[redacted]	29/11/2022	12:42:56	c:\users\User\document\Client Profile\mp-23 project brief.doc
ac_id_74 - signed.docx		29/11/2022	15:21:49	c:\users\User\document\Client Profile\ac_id_74 - signed.docx
security snippets nov 2022.pdf		29/11/2022	9:36:52	c:\users\User\document\Client Profile\\security snippets nov 2022.pdf
agreementreconciliation.pdf		29/11/2022	11:55:43	c:\users\User\document\Client Profile\agreementreconciliation.pdf
202208_client.xlsx		29/11/2022	10:13:53	c:\users\User\document\Client Profile\202208_client.xlsx
performance report.pdf		29/11/2022	11:21:31	c:\users\User\downloads\performance report.pdf
performance report (1).pdf		29/11/2022	11:21:39	c:\users\User\downloads\performance report (1).pdf
protect 1st work package costing.xlsx		6/12/2022	13:29:50	c:\users\admin\desktop\demos\project f20\protect 1st work package costing.xlsx

RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE RISKS

1. Users need to be educated and informed regarding their risky actions. There is a need to conduct user training on the identified risks. Moving forward, department heads can be passed reports about risky actions of their staff to ensure compliance on an ongoing basis. This also ensures better security as movement of information is reviewed by users who understand its sensitivity and use.
2. Use of network shared drives should be encouraged as a means for sharing files internally, and use of USB storage should be minimised. In case movement of information is required using USBs, DLP and encryption software should be used to provide visibility and protection of files.
3. Sensitive information should be encrypted when being sent to trusted 3rd parties or copied to removable USB storage or cloud applications. This ensures that, even in the case of loss or theft, sensitive information is not compromised, and fines or reputational loss can be avoided.
4. Disk or file-based encryption should be considered to protect data stored locally on devices. Microsoft's Bitlocker is a good option.
5. Access of sensitive files in cloud drives should be restricted to company devices and users only. There are multiple ways to implement this. Some examples include implementing CASB or file-based encryption.
6. Use of personal cloud drives and uploads to websites should be closely monitored. Access to them should be given only on a strong need basis.
7. Moving sensitive information via emails is unavoidable. Where required, it should always be zipped and password protected. A better approach is to maintain the files encrypted so that only authorised users can have access to the data in case of a breach.
8. Forwarding and sending sensitive corporate information to personal and 3rd party free accounts should be monitored. Business dealing using free email user accounts can make investigation tough in case of any litigation.
9. Use of non-corporate networks and printers should be monitored. Preventing users from using non-corporate network can greatly impact productivity, so a better approach would be to use specialised security software to monitor devices when connecting from home or using personal printers.
10. Users should be encouraged and reminded to seek advice from IT departments before installing and using non-corporate applications. Specialised asset management software can provide the visibility of use if they do not comply and can block the applications from running.

GuardWare offers several products designed to keep your data safe and can help implement the recommendations in this report.

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